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WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE JUDICIARY SWITCHES ROLES WITH THE LEGISLATOR? 
AN INNOVATIVE ISRAELI VERSION OF A MIXED JURISDICTION 
 
H Sandberg* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The continental civil system is distinguished from the common law by its recognised 
system of legislation. Both systems accept the supremacy of the statutory law over 
judge-made law, but statutory law still differs in its character from judge-made law. In 
the former, codices are analytic, abstract, and removed from the specific influence of 
particular cases. The solution to the particular case is derived by deduction from the 
abstract rule.1 In the latter, the legal rule is derived by a process of induction from a 
collection of specific precedents. Even when rules are codified, such as in the 
original English corporate legislation or the American Restatement, they reflect a 
collection of rulings and not a collection of analytic principles. These differences 
stem from the nature and the motivations of the legislative enterprise.  
 
Civil-continental legislation originates in a legislative initiative "from above". It is 
driven by the aspiration for legal harmony and completeness, and was originally 
formulated by academics. Legislation in the common-law countries results from a 
"bottom up" effect in which reality dictates the nature of the developing rules, step by 
step. Naturally this traditional distinction has become blurred over time; certain civil 
law states initiate legislation in response to particular needs originating from below.  
 
Other common law states create analytic codices, produced by groups of experts (for 
example, the uniform laws of the USA or the Law Commission process in England). 
In any event, the principle and logic of the matter is that to the extent that the 
legislation is more influenced by the particular circumstances of particular legal 
cases, as for example in the common-law systems, the law tends to be more specific 
                                                          
*
  Haim Sandberg. LLB LLM LLD (Hebrew University of Jerusalem). Associate Professor, Haim 
Stricks School of Law, College of Management, Rishon Lezion. Email: 
hsandbrg@netvision.net.il. I want to thank the Research Fund of my School of Law for its 
generous contribution to this research. 
1  The BGB had been criticised for being too abstract. Wieacker History of Private Law 377.  
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and less analytic. To the extent that the legislation is the product of scientific, a priori 
legislation in that particular realm, and not necessarily the product of a practical 
need, it will be more analytic and general. The role played by the judicial branch in 
the formulation of legislation in common-law systems is usually specific and not 
general. 
 
The traditional division of power between the judicial and the legislative branches 
may change in situations in which the judiciary has the authority or the power to 
influence the legislative agenda. Cases of this kind emerge when the judicial branch 
is empowered to judicially review laws, and to either strike them down or declare 
their incompatibility. In these cases there is a veritable role switch. In a manner 
resembling continent style legislation, the court reviewing existing legislation 
determines an abstract principle, usually in reliance on a particular constitutional text, 
and it is specifically the legislature that is required to distill the principles into specific 
legislative norms, a function normally fulfilled by the common law court. The question 
forming the basis of this paper is the nature of the legislative process and the 
legislation produced by this kind of relationship.  
 
The paper addresses this question through the narrow prism of a concrete, in-depth 
examination of a particular Israeli text case – the Karsik case.2 In this case the Israeli 
Supreme Court handed down a fundamental ruling which entitled the original owners 
of land "in principle" to the restitution of their land upon the fulfillment or termination 
of the public purpose for which it was expropriated. Having established the principle 
that should guide the decision in the particular case, and at its own initiative, the 
Court delegated to the legislature the task of implementing and providing a specific 
legal arrangement based on this principle, on the basis of which the Court would 
then rule on the concrete case. The result was that in this particular case the 
traditional roles of the respective branches were reversed.  
 
                                                          
2  Karsik v State of Israel HCJ 2390/96 [Isr SC] PD 55(2)625 (2001) (hereafter Karsik). The 
references in this article are to the formal English translation at the Supreme Court of Israel 2001 
elyon1.court.gov.il. 
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The paper further claims that this mechanism leads to the creation of a new variation 
of a "mixed-system". The judiciary abandoned its primary obligations, namely to 
serve as an instance for resolving disputes, while the legislature became an executor 
of judicially enunciated principles. The law thus enacted resembles, in its detailed 
and complex language, a common law text while the principle formulated in the 
judgment of the court resembles a section of an analytical "civil law" statute. When 
the motivation for legislation stems from the court's directives rather than 
governmental or legislative interests, the legislature or the executive branch has an 
interest in thwarting the legislation through various tactics. This process gives rise to 
the vague and detailed formula of the legislation, and guards it from assuming the 
abstract nature of civil law legislation. The lesson that this episode teaches us, which 
the courts itself internalised, is that the Court cannot really dictate a legislative 
agenda and it should focus on its designated role – the resolving of concrete 
disputes. 
 
The first section of this article begins with a survey of the Karsik case and a 
presentation of the exceptional features that characterised the Court's conduct. The 
second section focuses on the executive and legislative response. The third section 
analyses the nature of legislation initiated by a judicial attempt to dictate a legislative 
agenda to the legislature. The article concludes with the lessons emerging from this 
case analysis. 
 
2 The roles of the judiciary reversed 
 
2.1 The Karsik case  
 
In February 2001 the Israeli Supreme Court handed down a fundamental ruling, the 
Karsik case, which entitled the original owners of land "in principle" to the restitution 
of their land upon the fulfillment or termination of the public purpose for which it was 
expropriated.3 The Court's establishment of this rule resulted from an innovative 
                                                          
3  Karsik 60 (J Cheshin para 88). 
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constitutional interpretation of an old legislation.4 Its interpretation of the legislation 
was inspired by the statutory provisions of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty, which is regarded in Israel as a statute with constitutional status, and states 
that from the point of its legislation "there shall be no violation of the property of a 
person" (section 3) and "there shall be no violation of rights under this Basic Law 
except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper 
purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required" (section 8).5 The Karsik ruling 
was perceived, at that time, as both novel and groundbreaking.6 It was considered 
as such for three main reasons: Israel does not have an explicit statutory provision 
requiring the return of expropriated land to its owner; the Israeli Supreme Court had 
never ordered the return of land to an owner under similar circumstances before the 
enactment of the Basic Law; and the judicial review carried out by the Israeli 
Supreme Court on the powers of expropriation in Israel had been considered, until 
then, to be very moderate.7 
 
The size of the panel deliberating on the matter attests to the importance attributed 
to the issue under discussion, and perhaps to the intention to send a message to the 
public and the executive branch concerning the importance of the ruling.8 The 
judgment was even translated into English for the purposes of the Supreme Court 
website and was displayed together with all the other judgments that the manager of 
the site deemed worthy of sharing with a worldwide audience.9 The judgment's 
innovative message was particularly well received by landowners whose lands had 
been expropriated, some of whom filed actions for the restitution of lands that had 
                                                          
4  Lands (Expropriation) Ordinance 1943 (hereafter the Ordinance); Sandberg 2010 Is L R 590 (this 
British Mandate legislation was the central legislative tool for state execution of land 
expropriations in the early days of the State of Israel). 
5  Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 1992; Navot Constitutional Law 45; Karsik 20, 26 (J 
Cheshin), 76 (J Barak), 65, 67 (J Zamir), 71 (J Strasberg-Cohen), 79 (J Dorner), 84 (J Beinisch) 
and 86 (J Mazza).  
6  Holzman-Gazit Land Expropriation in Israel 167-168; Wolff 2009 Stan J Int'l L 324. 
7  Sandberg 2010 Global Jurist 21. 
8  The percentage of judgments in which the Supreme Court sits in a panel in excess of five 
justices is extremely low. Shachar, Gross and Harris 1997 Tel-Aviv University Law Review 753. 
9  Karsik, English translation. 
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been expropriated, or relied upon it in pending actions or appeals, at all judicial 
levels.10 
 
2.2 The switch of roles  
 
As already noted, the Supreme Court's ruling in Karsik was defined as a ruling "in 
principle". The central criterion for evaluating a principle lies in its implementation, 
but in the case under discussion the Court on its own initiative delegated the task of 
implementing its ruling - to the legislature. Initially the Court was content to make a 
general call to the legislature to amend the law accordingly; the implementation of its 
ruling in the concrete case was deferred pending a full presentation of the petitioners' 
claims pertaining to various questions raised by the case, and especially the 
question of the retroactive application of the ruling in principle to expropriations that 
preceded the ruling. 11 At this stage, apparently, the call to the legislature was not 
meant to replace the Court's substantive decision in the case at hand, and the Court 
still intended to rule on the case itself.12  
 
However, with the passage of time during the progress of the legislative process, it 
became increasingly clear that the Court was backtracking on its intention to resolve 
the dispute, deferring its decision in the case on five occasions.13 Finally, the task of 
resolving the dispute was summarily shelved. Judith Karsik and the other petitioners 
were forced to wait eight years from the time that the Court gave its ruling 
recognising their rights "in principle" until 2009, when the Court decided to delete 
their petition until the legislature deigned to complete the legislation of the new 
expropriations law, which would give substantive and concrete substance to the 
                                                          
10  At least 14 cases were counted in the Supreme Court in which private owners based their claims 
on the Karsik precedent. 
11  Karsik 61-62 (J Cheshin), 71 (J Zamir), 72 (J Strasberg-Cohen), 79 (J Barak), 79 (J Levin), 82 (J 
Dorner), 84 (J Beinisch), 85 (J Or) and 86 (J Mazza).  
12  Karsik 62 (J Cheshin), 71 (J Zamir), 72 (J Strasberg-Cohen), 83 (J Dorner), 85 (J Or).  
13  Karsik v State of Israel HCJ 2390/96 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (2) 875 (2002) (2nd Karsik) 876; 
Karsik v State of Israel HCJ 2390/96 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (3) 964 (2005) (3rd Karsik) 964; 
Karsik v State of Israel HCJ 2390/96 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (2) 3508 (2006) (4th Karsik) 3508; 
Karsik v State of Israel HCJ 2390/96 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (2) 4727 (2007) (5th Karsik) 4727; 
Karsik v State of Israel HCJ 2390/96 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (2) 1975 (2008) (6th Karsik) 1975. 
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principle that the Court had established in its "fundamental" ruling.14 Indeed, the 
utilisation of the "deletion" mechanism, as opposed to "dismissal", was not prejudicial 
to the petitioner's rights, and prima facie they were entitled to renew their petition in 
the event of its transpiring that the legislature was unduly delaying the legislation. 
The Court similarly left open the option of challenging the constitutionality of the new 
legislation that was to be adopted, in addition to the option of suing for remedies 
provided thereunder.15 Regardless, the Court's working assumption was that the 
dispute would be resolved by the legislature. One year later the long-awaited law 
was finally enacted16 but, as will be explained in 3, its contents were not especially 
related to those of the Court's ruling in principle and to a large extent actually 
contradicted them, in letter as well as in spirit. The practical, concrete result of the 
Supreme Court's move to delegate the implementation of a far-reaching and 
fundamental ruling to the legislature was, at least as it appears at this stage, a 
subversion of the fundamental ruling, and delayed justice for the parties who sought 
a ruling on the matter. The petitioners advocate, Alon Samuel, expressed the 
feelings of his clients in the following words: 
 
Those petitioners that are still alive have a grave feeling of mistrust and 
serious injustice. They feel that they are used by the judicial authority to 
leverage itself against the Knesset [The Israeli Parliament] and the executive 
branch while their personal case is mistreated.17 
 
The Court's call to the legislature in the Karsik case exposes a mode of procedure 
that is unique in both the Israeli and the comparative contexts. A court's deferral to 
the legislature is not exceptional as such, but it is usually supposed to be incidental 
to the court's decision on the case before it. In some cases the court's decision is of 
immediate effect, and the court simply makes a request to the legislature, in the 
wake of its ruling, to supplement lacunae or defects by way of legislation. 
Occasionally the court will rule on the dispute but defer the practical implementation 
of its decision in the particular matter, pending a more comprehensive regulation of 
                                                          
14  Karsik v State of Israel HC 2390/96 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (1) 1743 (2009) (7th Karsik) 1743. 
15  7th Karsik 1748. 
16  Amendment of Land (Expropriation) Ordinance (No. 3) Law 2010 (hereafter Amendment Law). 
17  Baum 2008 www.themarker.com.  
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the matter by the legislature.18 In this case the Court recognised a general principle 
but altogether avoided any attempt to actually apply it in the case before it and in 
many additional cases. The Court did not rule that the land should be restored to the 
petitioners, but neither did it rule that it should not be restored. The Court went even 
further and actually sent the petitioners to present their claims to the parliament.19 
 
2.3 The Court as a legislator and the legislator as a judge 
 
The Court's conduct deviated radically from the accepted conception of its role. First, 
the resolution of disputes is generally regarded as the specific mandate of the 
judicial and not the legislative branch. The latter, in its legislative capacity, is not 
charged with the resolution of specific disputes, but rather with the implementation of 
general policies in legislation. The conventional concept of the separation of powers 
is that the legislature is not the appropriate body to interpret the question of the 
application of the law in a particular case and the conventional concept of the rule of 
law requires legislation to be general rather than "private" and intended for particular 
people.20 However, while the legislative branch is not meant to solve specific 
disputes, this is the court's primary role and the establishment of new rules is 
secondary to this role.21 Courts are obliged to rule on disputes brought before them 
by applying the principles of law and the judge cannot avoid ruling on a dispute that 
he was charged with resolving.22 The judge interpreting a statute should not (or need 
not) have any consideration for the legislature's "judicial conception", or for his 
perception of how the legislature might have decided the dispute.23  
 
Second, the accepted concept of the separation of powers is that "legislation is the 
delegation of interpretation of a statute to the judiciary".24 The law establishes the 
principles and the judge applies them in the specific resolution of cases brought 
before him. It is precisely the judges who are more familiar with the particular cases 
                                                          
18  Mersel 2005 Mishpat Umimshal 55 ff; Rubinstein and Medina Constitutional Law 157.  
19  5th Karsik 4728. 
20  Rubinstein and Medina Constitutional Law 152, 287. 
21  Barak General Theory 168; Gavison "Public involvement of the Supreme Court" 76. 
22  Cohen v Attorney General PD 8(1) 21 (1954); Edri v Haskal PD 47(5) 337-338 (1993). 
23  Barak General Theory 168.  
24  Barak General Theory 193. 
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in which there is a need to implement the law and this direct access and connection 
with the concrete cases enables them to translate the general principles set forth by 
the legislator into arrangements that are more specific and precise.25 The perception 
of the legislature as being charged with the establishment of primary arrangements 
also reflects the position of the Israeli Supreme Court.26  
 
The early stages of Karsik, however, indicate a different kind of interaction. The 
Court unabashedly established itself as the supra-legislature that determines an 
abstract principle and it was specifically the legislator that was required to distill the 
principles into details, as though it was secondary legislation. The singularity of this 
conduct lies not in the fact that the Court articulated new principles and proposed to 
the legislature to adopt or reject them. Rather, it derives from the Court's attempt to 
force the legislator into adopting them by way of legislation. Whereas the call upon 
the legislature to legislate in accordance with the principle established and the 
decision to leave the file pending seems to have been an outright attempt to 
influence the legislative agenda, the failure to decide the case may appear to be a 
form of judicial restraint. 
 
From the comparative perspective, too, a judicial mode of action whereby the court 
articulates a principle and abdicates its duty to give it concrete implementation is 
likewise exceptional. The Israeli system of judicial review enables the Supreme 
Court to invalidate Knesset legislation, but the Knesset for its part can, by legislation, 
override a ruling of the Supreme Court either by a regular or a special majority.27 In 
this sense it resembles the Canadian model, in which the court can strike down a law 
but the Parliament can override the ruling.28 This is weaker than the system 
accepted in the USA, where a court can invalidate a law, and its invalidation is 
unreviewable.29 It is stronger than the UK human rights judicial model, in which a 
judicial declaration of the "incompatibility" of a statute does not alter the applicable 
                                                          
25  Cooter Strategic Constitution 199-200.  
26  Barak 2002 Harv L Rev 136. 
27  Navot Constitutional Law 50. 
28  Bateup 2009 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 534; s 33 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
1982, Part I Constitution Act 1982, Schedule B Canada Act 1982 (UK).  
29  Bateup 2009 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 552. 
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law for as long as the legislature has not decided to adopt it in legislation.30 It is 
conceded that the Karsik case was not concerned with the annulment of a law but 
rather with giving it a new, novel interpretation, but a new interpretation of a law may 
have greater long-term consequences than would its annulment, because whereas 
the annulment of a law can be countered by conflicting legislation, a particular 
interpretation of the legislation may be maintained, even when confronted with new 
legislation.31 The operative mode in Karsik differs from all of the modes previously 
described, because none of the latter included the court's abdication of its right and 
duty to decide. Rather than trying to analyse the reasons for this uncommon pattern 
of judicial behavior, we shall try in the next section to see how the other branches 
acted in response to the changes that the Court tried to dictate.  
 
3 Legislation under the Court's order 
 
3.1 Executive branch rebellion 
 
In the parliamentary regime of the State of Israel, where the executive branch is led 
by the representatives of the coalition majority, a judicial initiative to delegate 
legislative power to the legislative authority is in theory directed at the majority 
controlling the parliament, and in fact at the executive branch. For as long as the 
parliamentary majority is stable and coalition discipline preserved, the executive 
authority exercises extensive power on the legislation – more so than in legal 
systems in which the parliament and the executive authority are separated.32 
Legislative initiatives in Israel generally begin with the Government and even private 
members' bills will ultimately be navigated by the executive branch.33 Indeed, 
politicians representing the public are at the apex of the executive branch, but the 
legislative process is ultimately channeled into the workings of the governmental civil 
service that actually formulates the concrete details of policies. The legislative 
process that the court initiated began with civil servants and only eventually did it 
reach the parliamentary labyrinth.  
                                                          
30  Bateup 2009 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 543; s 4 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).  
31  Bateup 2009 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 543, 571-572.  
32  Cooter Strategic Constitution 215 ff. 
33  Rubinstein and Medina Constitutional Law 170 (fn 179); Zilber Bureaucracy as Politics 31-32. 
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Civil servants or bureaucrats are no doubt subordinate to the directives of politicians, 
but they evince a natural tendency to enlarge the organisations they control as well 
as the resources and powers at their disposal.34 It is only natural that the state 
authorities charged with the administration of state assets will seek to perpetuate 
their control of the inventory of government assets, in addition to retaining maximal 
freedom of action in exercising their purchasing powers for public purposes in order 
to enlarge it. This consideration may reflect a particular social or economic policy of 
the public representatives, but it may also be of independent standing deriving from 
the nature of the organisation controlling the assets, and may tip the scale in favour 
of retaining assets in excess of what would be required in terms of public policy.35 
The significance of this consideration may increase when the guidelines of political 
policy are not clearly delineated, or when the governmental bureaucracy is granted a 
large measure of discretion, or when there are frequent replacements at the political 
- ministerial level.36 These factors may well whet the bureaucracy's desire to thwart 
the judicial directive to enact a law that would formalise the restitution of assets from 
the state to their private owners.  
 
The executive branch is obviously obliged to respect the judicial branch, but even so, 
both the branch and its bureaucrats may have their own strategic considerations. 
The executive branch may be likely to weigh up the probable response of the judicial 
branch to a move that would foil its initiatives. It will try to avoid a direct conflict with 
the court by using a strategy based on circuitous tactics in order to thwart the judicial 
directive, without disclosing its real, covert motivation.  
 
Such considerations originating in the senior bureaucracy of the executive branch 
are discernible in its treatment of the Supreme Court's guidelines in the Karsik case. 
One of the informal tools for the derailing of a judicial directive is the delaying of its 
execution.37 This kind of delay may reduce public interest in the issue or simply 
                                                          
34  Zilber Bureaucracy as Politics 43 ff; Cooter Strategic Constitution 152. 
35  The former president of the Supreme Court, Justice Aharon Barak, described, in one of his 
books, the Treasury's initiative to enact a law that was meant to change the judicial interpretation 
given to existing tax legislation as an activity of a "pressure group". Barak Statutory Interpretation 
76.  
36  Cooter Strategic Constitution 166-167. 
37  Bateup 2009 Hastings Int'l & Comp L Rev 553 (text after fn 92). 
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postpone the directive in anticipation of planned or unplanned changes in the 
positions of the public representatives or the judges themselves. The time period 
between the handing down of the ruling of the Karsik case and the enactment of the 
much-awaited amendment as well as personal changes in the composition of the 
panel and the composition of the legislative and executive branches all attest to the 
success of this tactic.38  
 
Another tool for camouflaging the move to thwart the judicial ruling was rerouting it to 
the path of a professional examination as opposed to an examination of political 
policy considerations. In July 2001, five months after the Court had called for the 
enactment of a new expropriations law, the incumbent Minister of Finance charged 
an "inter-ministries committee" with the evaluation of the change.39 Prima facie the 
establishment of the Committee constituted an achievement for the Court, because it 
would not have been established if not for the Court's call to the legislature. The 
committee's founding document explicitly stated that the court's reference to the 
legislature was the reason for its establishment.40  
 
All the same, the very establishment of the Committee presaged the direction it 
would take. First, an "inter-ministries" committee consists exclusively of bureaucrats 
who dictate its positions. Its membership does not include those who represent other 
interests or who are by definition independent. Neither did the Committee include so 
much as a single independent expert, lawyer, land appraiser, planner, academic, 
judge or retired judge with expertise in the disciplines related to the committee's 
mandate, and who was not a governmental civil servant.41 The only representative 
who was not a bureaucrat was the legal advisor of the Tel-Aviv Municipality, who 
was also an employee of a body which is usually the executor of expropriations and 
not their victim. The Committee's composition lacked any representation of various 
                                                          
38  All judges (except J Beinisch) who were members of the panel that ruled the first Karsik case 
retired during the nine years that followed. At the same time five different governments and four 
terms of the Knesset came and went. 
39  Israel Ministry of Finance 2004 www.finance.gov.il Cover letter (Inter-ministries Committee 
Report). 
40  Inter-ministries Committee Report Cover letter. 
41  Inter-ministries Committee Report Cover letter. Although the committee hired an Israeli expert 
jurist to make a comparative study and invited another opinion from a German expert, both were 
not members of the committee. 
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bodies in the private sector that might have had an interest in the matter, and 
conspicuously refrained from inviting the public to express its views on the matters 
under discussion. 
 
In contrast to the non-representation of independent representatives, there was a 
conspicuous majority of state employees on the Committee, all of them 
representatives of the central government ministries charged with the administration 
of state assets: legal advisors of the Finance Ministry, the Construction and 
Residence Ministry, the National Infrastructures Ministry, the Israel Land 
Administration authority, the National Roads Company, and the Deputy Supervisor of 
Budgets in the Finance Ministry.42 In addition there were two civil servants from the 
Ministry of Justice, who in view of the composition of the Committee were the only 
members who did not represent an interested government ministry.43 In fact, when a 
dispute emerged between the Committee members concerning the justification for a 
right to restitution in cases of failure to realise the public purpose of the expropriation 
it was precisely the representatives of the Justice Ministry who supported restitution, 
whereas the representatives of the ministries administering the assets supported its 
negation and its limitation to the right to repurchase the asset.44  
 
The composition of the Committee may have portended that its work would not result 
in stronger expression being given to the interests of the original land owners (which 
at least in terms of the public expectation were supposedly reflected in the Court's 
original decision), and that instead it would protect the interests of the relevant 
ministries. It may be assumed that the filling of positions in the Committee was not 
left to chance, being instead the product of intentional planning. The Committee's 
composition did in fact influence the format of its deliberations. Ultimately the 
Committee produced a recommendation that led to the enactment of a law that 
thwarted the Karsik ruling, as expected and as described below.  
 
                                                          
42  Inter-ministries Committee Report Cover letter. 
43  Inter-ministries Committee Report Cover letter.  
44  Inter-ministries Committee Report 37-42.  
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The anchoring of government policy in the conclusions of a "committee" bestows a 
professional or even scientific character on the government decision and totally 
disguises the interest-biased character of a government decision that tends to 
preserve resources under the control of bureaucrats. Indeed, bureaucrats cannot 
dictate their wishes to the political level to which they report, but the establishment of 
a committee may confer greater immunity against interference upon their 
recommendations. During the discussions in the Knesset's finance committee the 
state's legal advisors based their arguments on the recommendations of the Inter-
ministries Committee or the lack thereof. For example, when the chairman of Real 
Estate Appraisers Association offered to put into the new law an "expropriation 
compensation clause" the Treasury's representative responded: "... It is not the 
subject that the Inter–ministries committee even discussed".45 When the chairman 
offered to set deadlines for the expropriation, the Government representative replied: 
"The Inter-ministries committee had already heard the authorities which deal with 
these things".46  
 
Public support plays an important role in such a matter. The public may view the 
decisions of a professional "civil servant" as ultimately professional and free of any 
alien considerations, whereas a politician's attempts to alter and/or detract from a 
committee's recommendations may be perceived as being motivated by alien 
interests. From the politician's perspective this public perception may have negative 
electoral repercussions and thus deter him from introducing changes into a proposal 
of the civil service, notwithstanding the "purity" of his motives. Information on the 
attitudes of Israeli citizens that was collected, on the basis of a random sample of the 
adult population (aged 18 years or older), in surveys that were conducted 
continuously every year from 2001 indicates that Public confidence in the Knesset, 
Knesset members, government ministers and political parties is consistently lower 
than public trust in governmental institutions and government officials.47 Civil 
servants do indeed usually work on behalf of the public. By virtue of their 
professional training, their period of service and experience they have a professional 
                                                          
45  Finance Committee Protocol (26.10.2009) 11; Finance Committee Protocol (8.12.2009) 41.  
46  Finance Committee Protocol (26.10.2009) 26 (Treasury representative); Finance Committee 
Protocol (9.11.2009) 3 (Ministry of Justice's representative). 
47  Vigoda-Gadot and Mizrahi 2009 cpmp.hevra.haifa.ac.il 32, 39.  
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advantage over the political level, which is subject to frequent changes on the 
personal level. All the same, the fact that the process of producing decisions is 
seemingly a serious and professional one of a "committee" does not necessarily 
immunise the committee and its decisions from overt or covert policy considerations.  
 
The formulation of the recommendations of the civil service may similarly affect the 
chances of altering the formulation at more senior levels. For example, the 
formulation of the recommendations in a manner offering a choice between 
alternatives informs the eventual decision makers of the existence of different policy 
options and enables them to prefer the option most appropriate in their own eyes. On 
the other hand, a "take it or leave it" formulation, as most of the recommendations 
were worded in the case in point, makes it difficult to reject the recommendations. In 
such a case, no alternatives may be offered, and a relatively large measure of daring 
and initiative would be required in order to disqualify the only alternative up for 
discussion.48 This is nicely demonstrated by the deft wording of the 
recommendations of the Inter-ministries Committee concerning the nature of the 
right to restitution conferred as a result of a failure to realise the public purpose of the 
expropriation. Rather exceptionally, and due to a dispute between its members, the 
Committee report presented one alternative under which the land would be restored 
to the original owner and another alternative which would give him only the right to 
repurchase the land.49 This presentation of alternatives enabled the Finance Minister 
to choose the option of restitution, which was closer to the spirit of the Karsik ruling, 
and this option was actually included in the memorandum of the law that was 
disseminated to the public.50 An internal dynamic, however, the nature of which is 
not clear, but which was presumably influenced by the existence of documentation of 
different alternatives,51 led the Government finally to adopt the more limited option - 
                                                          
48  Cooter Strategic Constitution 218. 
49  Inter-ministries Committee Report 37-42. 
50  Section 14B(b), Memorandum of Amendment to Land (Expropriation) Ordinance (Amendment 
No. 3) 2004-5765. A copy is saved with the author. 
51  Finance Committee Protocol (26.10.2009) 7 (Advocate Dorfman of the Knesset Finance 
Committee informs the committee about the government decision without any reference to the 
apparent change from the wording of the memorandum but with reference to the limited option in 
the Inter-ministries Committee Report). 
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the right to repurchase.52 This may have been the amendment of a tactical "error" 
that occurred in the course of presenting the two alternatives to the decision makers.  
 
We see that the first and most significant barrier that the judicial order has to 
overcome is the opposition of the government bureaucracy, which naturally had no 
motivation to implement an agenda that was not initiated in the government 
ministries. These civil officers used an arsenal of tools to immunise its 
recommendations against the interference of both the elected policy makers and the 
court. As we shall see in the next paragraph, while these techniques did not 
absolutely entrench the recommendations against a deeper legislative examination, 
it reduced the chances that such an investigation would actually enable the thwarting 
of its recommendations.  
 
3.2 The legislature caught between the executive branch and the judiciary 
 
The significant weight of the senior civil service in the formulation of the subversive 
bill found expression in the discussions of the Knesset's Finance Committee in 
preparing the law for a vote in the plenum, in which the representatives of the 
bureaucracy were both numerically and substantively dominant.53 The central 
sources of opposition to the bureaucrats, expressing positions in favour of the 
restitution of expropriated lands, were the representatives of two interest groups that 
stood to benefit from the Karsik ruling – a representative of the Bar Association, and 
representatives of the Land Appraisers Bureau.54 The direct victims of the Karsik 
case who, it will be recalled, were sent by the Court to present their cases before the 
legislature, were far more modestly represented and in fact had no influence on the 
                                                          
52  Section 14B(b) Draft Bill of Land (Expropriation) (Ordinance) (Amendment No. 3) 2006 (Draft 
Bill).  
53  Representatives of Ministries of Finance, Justice and Housing and representatives of Israel Land 
Administration, National Roads Company and The National Railway Company participated in 
most if not all these discussions. 
54  The most prominent voice in favour of land owners was made by the Bar Association 
representative, attorney Yoram Hajbi, and representatives of the Real Estate Appraisers 
Association (chairman Erez Cohen, his legal adviser and the appraiser Nehama Bugin). They 
participated very actively in almost all meetings.  
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result.55 They lacked the backing of any powerful and influential organisation that 
could have accepted the challenge and persuaded the legislature to support their 
cause.56 This may be perfectly illustrated by the following discussion between the 
chairman of the Finance Committee, MK Gafni, and Advocate Alon Samuel, who 
represented some of the petitioners in the Karsik case itself and attended the last 
meeting (15.12.2009). In the beginning of this last meeting, just before the committee 
was prepared to vote on the final version of the law, the chairman gave Samuel the 
right to speak: "Advocate Alon Samuel, I'll give you a minute or two to talk, even 
though we had finished our discussion. Knesset speaker asked and I will give you 
that". Immediately after Samuel had finished, the committee came to a vote.57 
 
While many reservations to the Government bill naturally came from leftwing 
opposition parties, the opposition naturally did not have much chance of forcing an 
alteration of a dictat on the part of the executive branch, and all of their proposed 
amendments were rejected.58 Barring the chairman of the Finance Committee and its 
deputy, only left-wing opposition Knesset members sought permission to speak 
during the plenary discussion before the Knesset plenum.59 As opposition M.K 
(Member of Knesset) Oron testified, "Nothing will pass in the plenum. The 
automatism in the plenum is one hundred times greater".60  
 
                                                          
55  Advocate Moshe Shuv, who represented some of the petitioners whose petitions were pending 
before the Supreme Court, participated in three meetings (02.12.2009, 14.12.2009, 15.12.2009); 
Professor Shlomo Bunimovitz, heir of the land expropriated on "Pi-Glilot" site in Tel- Aviv, who 
was also a party to a petition that lay before the Supreme Court, participated in two meetings 
(12.07.2009, 14.12.2009).  
56  For an analysis of the different but significant roles that libertarian NGOs played in supporting the 
wave of statutory amendments of expropriation laws that spread over USA after Kelo, see 
Nadler, Seidman Diamond and Patton "Government Takings of Private Property" 302.  
57  Finance Committee Protocol (15.12.2009) 2. 
58  The amendments included proposals to allow restitution even when the purpose of the purchase 
was realised on most of the expropriated area but not entirely (MK Swede), to prevent a 
subsequent change of the public purpose (MK Swede, Yachimovich and Oron), or to apply the 
law on expropriation retrospective to the founding of the state (Oron and Swede). Finance 
Committee Protocol (14.12.2009) 55; Finance Committee Protocol (15.12.2009) 9-10.  
59  Two MKs in the first plenary discussion (Bashara and Tibi) and five in the second and third 
plenary discussions (Oron, Yachimovich, Tibi, Zahalka and Swede). Records of the 74th Session 
of the 17th Knesset 5058-5061; Records of the 107th Session of the 18th Knesset 68-108. 
60  Finance Committee Protocol (14.12.2009) 57. 
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But the members of the government did not have much success in defeating the 
bureaucrats either. It is usually the coalition parties with a right-wing economic 
orientation that are expected to guard the interests of private property, but in this 
case the tables were reversed and it was the left-wing parties that attempted to 
represent them. This anomaly was well described by MK Yachimovich (Israel Labour 
Party) in the words: 
 
According to my world view, which is a social–democratic…the public needs often 
prevail over property right of a person, and it is right to expropriate land from a 
private person for the sake of the entire public… But if the expropriated land is not 
used any more for public purposes, then if you do not return it and make it tradable 
asset ... I think that there is most severe harm in the sense of justice…This thing is 
not good, not worthy. Land should be returned to its owner immediately after the 
end of the public purpose for which it was taken.61 
 
The impression derived from the deliberations is that none of the MKs saw 
themselves as enthusiastic supporters of the Government bill, and even the 
members of the coalition saw themselves as being subject by the Government's 
dictates, which were nothing but the dictates of the civil service. "One might have 
thought that this was our draft bill. This is the Government's bill", said Chairman 
Gafni, the Committee Chairman, to his colleague from the opposition, Haim Oron.62 
And elsewhere: "I'll do what the Government says. I'm not going to battle with the 
Government over this; I'll go to battle with the Government on other matters".63 It 
thus comes as no surprise that none of the participants in the legislative process was 
able to overcome the main, obstructive elements of the Government's bill, as 
originally formulated by the Inter-ministries Committee.  
 
Knesset members succeeded in introducing only a few minor changes in the bill 
within the spirit of the judicial order, and primarily in contexts where there was 
recorded evidence of a dispute among the representatives of the executive civil 
service. During the deliberations of the Finance Committee the Knesset Members 
were informed of such a dispute in the recommendations of the Inter-ministries 
                                                          
61  Records of the 107th Session of the 18th Knesset 86.  
62  Finance Committee Protocol (14.12.2009) 13. 
63  Finance Committee Protocol (8.12.2009) 17.  
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Committee,64 and the result was that the Committee Chairman drafted a preliminary 
position in favour of the more liberal option.65 This formed the basis of a draft that he 
submitted for discussion by the secondary commission established for the 
preparation of the law. In the course of the debate numerous references were made 
to the two alternatives presented in the Committee's report.66 This position, the result 
of a breach in the otherwise united front presented by the executive branch, was the 
central achievement of the Committee, regarding which the Committee Head could 
congratulate himself, saying that "this is something that we have battled for"67 and 
later "…don't say that the Finance Committee is a mere rubber stamp. We succeed 
in changing things."68 Yet at the end of the day a "compromise" proposal was 
adopted under which restitution would be limited to much fewer cases.69 
  
4 The results of the reversal of roles 
 
4.1 The nature of the new law  
 
Despite this minor success the Amendment70 actually derailed the broad principle 
determined by the Court. The new law realises the meta-principle established by the 
Court in a particularly limited form and to large extent actually contradicts it, in letter 
as well as in spirit. Its transition provisions sealed the fate of the petitioners' rights, 
stating unequivocally that the law would not apply where the public purpose had 
been fulfilled before its commencement.71 These provisions rendered the new law 
almost totally irrelevant, given that most of the expropriations under the original 
Ordinance were carried out up until the eighties, and that the State has made 
sparing use of the tool of expropriations under the Ordinance over the past few 
                                                          
64  Inter-ministries Committee Report 37-42. 
65  Finance Committee Protocol (26.10.2009) 6.   
66  Finance Committee Protocol (9.11.2009) 6.  
67  Finance Committee Protocol (8.12.2009) 24. 
68  Finance Committee Protocol (15.12.2009) 4. This achievement was presented by MK Gafni in 
the beginning of the speech in which he presented the bill for final voting in the Knesset's 
plenum. Records of the 107th Session of the 18th Knesset 70.  
69  Finance Committee Protocol (8.12.2009) 32 and Finance Committee Protocol (14.12.2009) 3.  
70  Amendment Law. 
71  Section 27(b)(1) Amendment Law. The lands of the petitioners had been expropriated more than 
forty years earlier. Karsik 6 (Notices of expropriation were published on 25.12.1958, 27.2.1959 
and 24.3.1966). 
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decades.72 The amended Ordinance does not confer upon the land owners a right to 
the restitution of the land, but rather a right to purchase the asset anew for the 
current market value in the event that in future, after the law's enactment, the 
purpose of the expropriation is fulfilled and then expires.73 The practical probability of 
any land owners actually benefitting from these rights is thus particularly low. The 
new law realises the meta-principle established by the Court in a particularly limited 
form. Evidently, the senior bureaucrats of the executive branch marked up a 
"strategic victory" in the campaign to foil the Karsik ruling. 
 
Another more formal characteristic of the new law is its vagueness. Its provisions are 
particularly cumbersome, so much so that occasionally it seems that its drafters 
sought to conceal its limiting approach in a maze of complex and obscure provisions. 
For example, the two sections containing the most narrowing affect on the rights 
purportedly conferred by the statutory amendment are actually tucked away into two 
marginal subsections deep within a thick forest of provisions.74  
 
While it may be conceded that the Court's directive and the legislative mandate were 
not limited to the specific subject treated of in Karsik, the new law actually focused 
on that particular subject. For example, the Committee and hence the legislator 
decided not to consider the implications of the Karsik ruling on expropriations under 
the Planning and Construction Law, which today is the central tool for the execution 
of expropriations.75  
 
It seems that when the Court and the legislature switch roles the law that is produced 
cannot detract from its judicial origin. The law thus enacted resembles in its detailed 
and complex language a common law text, while the principle formulated in the 
judgment of the court resembles a section of an analytical "civil law" statute. It is 
                                                          
72  Adv Eynat Kaufman of the Israel Land Administration (ILM) reported to the Knesset that only 30 
expropriations with a total area of 20,000 dunams had been executed since 1981, while 385,000 
dunams had been expropriated before 1981. Finance Committee Protocol (14.12.2009) 43.  
73  Section 14B The Ordinance (after amendment).  
74  For example, the transitional provisions that effectively deny retroactive application of the new 
amendment are not included in the revised Ordinance but only in the amending law. Other 
important reservations to the apparent right of restitution are hidden in sub-sections 14D(b) or 
14B(j)(1)-(2). 
75  Inter-ministries Committee Report 5.  
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connected to the circumstances of the case from which it originates. The famous 
maxim "hard cases make bad law" may be fairly applied to this peculiar statutory 
result. 
 
4.2 The Court draws its lessons 
 
The Supreme Court was aware both of the thrust of the arrangement proposed and 
the involvement of the executive branch in its formulation. On a practical level, 
however, the Court preferred to ignore the fact that these proposals contradicted the 
principle that it had determined. After the Knesset approved the amendment in its 
final restrictive wording the Court was actually released from the need to address the 
issue of retroactivity, which prima facie was the only question remaining for 
resolution in the wake of the original ruling "in principle". Even if the Court continues 
to claim that the amendment's constitutionality is still open for a decision, it seems 
that the Court has reconciled itself to the legislation.76  
 
However, the Court did in fact draw the lesson from the case. In the recent Even 
Zohar77 case the Court had another opportunity to adopt the Karsik format, but this 
time the Court avoided the attempt to dictate an agenda to the legislature. The 
question of principle in this case likewise concerned expropriations, and in a context 
no less fundamental than that of the Karsik case: the question was whether or not an 
order of the military closure and requisition of private land entitles the aggrieved land 
owner to compensation.78 The requisition was carried out under an old law which 
contains no explicit provision granting a right of compensation to the aggrieved 
landowners.79 All of the justices agreed that the application of the existing law was 
                                                          
76  In a recent case Chief Justice Beinicsh relied on the transition provisions in the Amendment Law 
but did not relate specifically to the question of the constitutionality of this law simply because 
"this question is not before us in this petition". Avney Derech v Minister of Finance HCJ 9614/03 
[Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (4) 2902, 2906 (2010). Justice Meltzer "noted" that the "ruling was here 
then, inter alia, on the assumption that the amendment was constitutional, but this assumption 
had not been tested" (at 2907). 
77  Even Zohar v State of Israel CA 2281/06 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (2) 1241 (2010). 
78  Even Zohar v State of Israel CA 2281/06 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (2) 1241 (2010) 1242 (the case 
referred to immovable property which was adjacent to a wide military training facility (a shooting 
range) which runs along the coast south of Rishon-Le-Zion to Palmahim). 
79  Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945. 
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not desirable, that it is inconsistent with the spirit of Basic Law and that the 
legislature would do well to amend it. Nonetheless, Justice Danziger was the only 
justice who proposed adopting the Karsik-technique – the establishment of a 
fundamental principle compelling compensation and the postponement of the legal 
proceeding until its legislative implementation. He enlisted the same reasons that 
served for the postponement of the ruling in the Karsik case.80 The majority of the 
justices were not prepared to adopt this technique in either of its aspects, despite 
their agreement that the matter indeed merited a legislative – and not a judicial – 
solution. Justice Procaccia said that "Arrangements of this kind should be 
established at the level of primary legislation, and are not a natural part of the judicial 
act".81 Justice Jubran concluded: 
 
We cannot get into the principle issue. It is the job of the legislature who should act 
to adjust the spirit of the law in question to the legal and social concepts of today. 
82 
 
Hence the Court dismissed the case.83 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
The Karsik case was a unique attempt of the judicial branch to dictate a detailed 
legislative agenda. This attempt did not succeed – and not surprisingly. The Court 
lacks the ability to impel the legislature to regulate an abstract principle in an analytic 
format similar to what is customary in the Civil-Law-Continental countries. At the end 
of the day the power to legislate rests with the legislature, and especially in a 
parliamentary system, with the executive branch. If a parliamentary majority wishes 
to thwart a legislative initiative, or when the sovereign administration has an interest 
in thwarting it, they possess the tools to do so in an effective manner, i.e. 
procrastination, the appointment of an inter-ministries committee, and the 
(intentionally) obscure formulation of the thwarting legislation. 
 
                                                          
80  Even Zohar v State of Israel CA 2281/06 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (2) 1241 (2010) 1261. 
81  Even Zohar v State of Israel CA 2281/06 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (2) 1241 (2010) 1272.  
82  Even Zohar v State of Israel CA 2281/06 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon (2) 1241 (2010) 1268. 
83  The appellants' request for a second hearing of the case has recently been denied. Even Zohar v 
State of Israel SCA 5151/10 [Isr SC] Takdin-Elyon 2010 (4) 1444 (2010). 
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The switch of roles in the case analysed apparently led to the creation of a new 
variation of a "mixed-system". The judiciary abandoned its primary obligations, 
namely to serve as an instance for resolving disputes, while the legislature became 
an executor of judicially enunciated principles. The law thus enacted resembles a 
common law text in its detailed and complex language, while the principle formulated 
in the judgment of the court resembles a section of an analytical "civil law" statute. 
Yet the lesson that this episode teaches us, which the court itself internalised, 
emphasises the common ground of both the Civil Law and Common Law systems - 
the Court cannot dictate a legislative agenda and it should focus on its designated 
role – the resolving of concrete disputes.  
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